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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

If you wanted to convince the public that
international trade agreements are a way to let
multinational companies get rich at the expense of
ordinary people, this is what you would do: give
foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive
tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for
compensation whenever a government passes a law
to, say, discourage smoking, protect the
environment or prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet
that is precisely what thousands of trade and
investment treaties over the past half century have
done, through a process known as “investor-state
dispute settlement”, or ISDS.1
This paper focuses on the main venue for investor-state dispute
settlement: the World Bank Group’s International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The paper’s analysis
establishes significant ICSID bias in favor of corporations and
commercial interests.
At its core, the paper is a case study of what transpired after the
government of El Salvador did not approve a mining concession for
a Canadian mining company and subsequently implemented an
environmentally-inspired moratorium on metals mining. The case
study was chosen in part because it is unusual for a poorer-country
government to prioritize the environmental costs of mining over
potentially significant foreign-exchange earnings from gold
deposits. The paper presents the Salvadoran case study by moving
from the local level to the national level in El Salvador, and then
proceeds to the global level to follow the investor-state suit filed by
Pac Rim Cayman against the Salvadoran government at the World
Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes.
The paper bookends the Salvadoran case-study with a broader
look at ICSID. The author begins with a brief history of ICSID, from
its controversial birth fifty years ago to its controversial present
1 Investor-state Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11,
2014, at 78, available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investorsarbitration.
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moment. Following the Salvadoran case, the author returns to
reflections on ICSID and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in
current and proposed trade and investment agreements.
The paper’s analysis of the El Salvador case, framed within the
broader umbrella of ICSID itself, reveals that ICSID is biased and
flawed in two main ways: (1) ICSID is biased in favor of corporate
and commercial interests over both government and non-corporate
non-governmental actors; and (2) ICSID excludes consideration of
vital, non-commercial interests such as the environment and the
broader public good. As the author will argue, these two biases
reinforce one another and make ICSID an institution ill-suited to
deal with the key challenges of our current historical moment and
of the future.
It is important to note the author writes as an interdisciplinary
scholar of development studies, building on academic expertise in
economics, ecology, and political economy (among other fields)
alongside decades of practice in rural communities, from the
Philippines to El Salvador, as well as hands-on policy experience
(notably as an international economist in the US Treasury
Department).
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ICSID
Let us begin with a brief but important history of ICSID, which
will help frame the debates surrounding this institution, as well as
threads that will be further explored in the Salvadoran case study.
ICSID was created some 50 years ago, opening its doors in 1966,
to deal with government expropriation of property of foreign
investors.2
The author’s historical research reveals, however, that ICSID has
been controversial since before it opened its doors. Indeed, at the
1964 World Bank annual meeting in Tokyo, 21 developing-country
governments voted “no” on the convention to set up this new part
of the World Bank Group where foreign corporations could sue
governments and bypass domestic courts.3 The 21 included all of
the 19 Latin American countries attending as well as the Philippines

2
3

ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, at 5, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006).
ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 66-67 (2012).
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and Iraq.4 The historic vote was dubbed “El No de Tokyo,” or the
Tokyo No.5 It is worth noting that, in the history of World Bank
initiatives, the vote stands as significant in terms of the large number
of participating countries against the initiative as well as the united
stance of all Latin American representatives.
It is also significant in terms of the reasons the 21 voted no. In
the words of then-representative of Chile, Félix Ruiz, speaking on
behalf of the Latin American countries voting no:
The legal and constitutional systems of all the Latin
American countries that are members of the Bank
offer the foreign investor at the present time the
same rights and protection as their own nationals;
they prohibit confiscation and discrimination and
require that any expropriation on justifiable
grounds of public interest shall be accompanied by
fair compensation fixed, in the final resort, by the
law courts.
The new system that has been suggested would give
the foreign investor, by virtue of the fact that he is a
foreigner, the right to sue a sovereign state outside
its national territory, dispensing with the courts of
law. This provision is contrary to the accepted legal
principles of our countries and, de facto, would
confer a privilege on the foreign investor, placing
the nationals of the country concerned in a position
of inferiority.6
To emphasize Ruiz’s key points, “the 21” deemed the new
investor-state dispute settlement system both unnecessary and
unfair. It is worth keeping this in mind as we proceed to the case

4
Id. There were 21 votes against ratifying the ICSID convention, including
the 19 Latin American World Bank member countries. The countries voting no
were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
5 Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace
ICSID Arbitration, 2 BEIJING L. REV. 134, 136 (2011); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID
Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009).
6 PARRA, supra note 3 at 66.
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study of El Salvador’s mining suit. To what extent has the 1964 “no”
vote been vindicated by history?
Despite the “no” votes, the formally titled Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States went forward to states for signatures from March 18,
1965 until October 14, 1966 when ICSID became a reality.7 For the
record, Brazil never joined, and in fact has refused to privilege
international investors through international investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanisms.8
In its early years, ICSID was small, indeed largely irrelevant. Its
first case was not filed until 1972, with just over two dozen cases
filed in total through 1988. In fact, there were a number of years
where no cases were filed.9 However, by the mid-1990s, ICSID
moved center-stage, thanks to the ISDS clauses inserted in neoliberal
bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements that
were proliferated starting in the 1980s and that exploded in the
1990s.10 In 2012 alone (forty years after ICSID’s first case was filed),

ICSID, supra note 2 at 5.
To expand upon this point for clarity (and fact-checking): Brazil has refused
to ratify the ICSID Convention or any bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with an
ISDS mechanism. Note that, while Brazil has signed onto some such BITs, they
have not been ratified by Brazil’s Congress, which sees them to be against the
country’s Constitution. Brazil does have arbitration agreements in contracts with
foreign investors. See Ricardo Berretto Ferreira Da Silva et al., Arbitration & ADR –
Brazil: Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Arbitration, INT’L LAW OFFICE
(May
15,
2003),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/
detail.aspx?g=6ce64813-8cf6-4f97-b8a8-2ad950fa25ad (providing access to the BITs
and international arbitrations at issue).
For more on this, see Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment
Arbitration in Brazil: Yes or No?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/30/investment-arbitration-in-brazil-yes-orno/ (illustrating Brazil’s refusal to formally ratify the ICSID Convention or BITs
with an ISDS mechanism); ICSID, ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/ _layouts/
mobile/mbllists.aspx (displaying ICSID caseload statistics and annual reports).
9
PARRA, supra note 3 at 199-260; Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America:
Criticism, Withdrawal and the Search for Alternatives, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Dec.
3, 2013), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp- content/ uploads/ 2013/
12/At-Issue-ICSID.pdf.
10
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD],
International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way
Forward, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3, U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.D.1 (2008), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf; Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of
Latin American Investment Arbitration, LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARB.:
THE CONFLICTS & CONTROVERSIES 69-82 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Mary H Mourra,
eds. 2008).
7
8
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48 new cases were added to ICSID’s docket. All of the 48 cases were
filed against governments of developing countries.11 And, of these
48 cases, more than one-third (17 or 35.45%) related to extractive
industries.12
3.

EL SALVADOR & GOLD MINING: FROM LOCAL, TO NATIONAL, TO
GLOBAL

With that framing and history of ICSID and the debate
surrounding it, let us now turn to the basic contours of the case of
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador. It is a case that the
author knows well as a result of four research trips to El Salvador
and related research in Washington, DC where ICSID is housed at
the World Bank.13 After presenting the case, the paper will turn to
broader reflections on bias in investor state dispute settlement at
ICSID.
The best way to present the case is to follow its chronology on
three levels – from local to national to global.

11
Sarah Anderson & Manuel Perez-Rocha, Mining for Profits in International
Tribunals: Lessons for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES 6 (Apr.
2013), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
Mining-for-Profits-2013-ENGLISH.pdf.
12 Id.
13
Unless otherwise noted, the information presented is based on my
fieldwork in El Salvador. I conducted field research in El Salvador in April and
May 2011, July and August 2012, May 2013, and July 2014. Research ranged from
more formal interviews (especially the case with interviews conducted with
government officials in various ministries in San Salvador) to informal, multipleday participant observation outside of San Salvador, especially in the province of
Cabañas. Research related to ICSID was done in Washington, D.C., where the
author is based.
For other useful written sources on this case, see Richard Steiner, El Salvador:
Gold, Guns, and Choice, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN)
COMM’N ON ENV’L, ECON., & SOCIAL POL’Y (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Rep
ort.pdf (discussing the backdrop of Pac Rim LLC v. Republic of El Salvador); Robert
E. Moran, Technical Review of the El Dorado Mine Project Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA), El Salvador, (Oct. 2005), http://www.votb.org/elsalvador/
Reports/Technical_Review_El_Dorado_EIA.pdf (detailing technical reports on the
mine and its environmental impact).
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3.1 At the local level:
El Salvador’s northern province of Cabañas is one of its poorest
provinces, with a population comprised largely of farmers, growing
corn and beans. It is also home to a rich gold vein that runs across
its Central American neighbors Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua. When global gold prices began to soar in the early 2000s,
the Canadian mining company Pacific Rim came to Cabañas in 2002,
the result of its merger with a company that had under three years
left of an eight-year exploration license.14 In El Salvador, as in many
countries, the process for getting a license to explore for gold or
other minerals is separate from the process for getting approval for
the actual “exploitation” or the mining concession itself. With its
license to explore, Pacific Rim continued exploration operations in
Cabañas.
Interviews suggest that many local inhabitants, originally
intrigued by the prospect of mining jobs, soon became concerned as
Pac Rim’s exploration operations proceeded.15 Some experienced
changes in water levels. Others learned more about the mining
process (the proximity of ongoing gold mining projects in
neighboring Honduras facilitated the education). They learned of
the toxic cyanide used by mining companies to separate the gold
from the rock and, in Cabañas as in much of the world, the arsenic
14 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, El
Salvador’s Rejoinder on the Merits 6 (July 11, 2014), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3321.pdf
[hereinafter Pac Rim].
15
This paragraph is based on the author’s in-country interviews, which
included Cabañas -based interviews during each of her field trips. For relevant
writing by the author that covers this terrain, see Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, El
Salvador: Toward a Mining Ban, in ENDING THE FOSSIL FUEL ERA 167-193 (T. Princen et
al. eds., MIT Press, 2015); Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, Poorer Countries and the
Environment: Friends or Foes? 72 WORLD DEV. 419-31 (2015); Robin Broad & John
Cavanagh, Like Water for Gold in El Salvador, THE NATION, Aug. 1/8, 2011, available
at http://www.thenation.com/article/162009/water-gold-el-salvador (noting that
this was written after the author’s first research trip to El Salvador).
For another source with details on the local level, see Richard Steiner, El
Salvador: Gold, Guns, and Choice, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE;
COMM’N ON ENVTL., ECON., AND SOC. POLICY, 13, 40-44 (2010),
http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Rep
ort.pdf.
The ICSID submissions by both Pacific Rim and the government of El Salvador,
and especially the July 2014 Rejoinder on Merits by the government, include
detailed chronologies on what happened and did not happen.
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embedded in the rock that would be released along with the gold.
Moreover, they learned of the acid mine drainage that would occur
as the mining operations exposed the sulfide-bearing rocks to the
elements. For these reasons, they became increasingly concerned
about the environmental impact of mining on both land and water
they depended on for small-scale agriculture and life in general.
Overall, their concerns focused on the impact on El Salvador’s main
Rio Lempa watershed, which supplies over half of El Salvador’s
drinking water.16
As concern and knowledge grew among individuals, a number
of small Cabañas-based non-governmental organizations began
various activities and organizing, with the intent to keep gold
mining out of Cabañas.17
For the purposes of this article, the details of the local level will
be limited to the above; the author (and others) has written
extensively about these elsewhere.18 However, before moving to the
national level, it is important to note that conflict erupted between
those who were against mining and those, including most local
mayors and some local Pac Rim employees, who were in favor of

16
See Robert Goodland, Responsible Mining: The Key to Profitable Resource
Development, 4 SUSTAINABILITY 2099 (2012) (describing the adverse environmental
impact of gold mining in El Salvador and in general, including the release of arsenic
and the problem of acid mine drainage). See also Dina L. Lopez, Professor and
Department Chair, College of Arts & Sciences, OHIO UNIV., http://www.
ohio.edu/geology/lopez/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) (explaining that her research
includes focusing on acid mine drainage and contamination in water). On arsenic
and gold mining in particular, see generally Jochen Bundschuh et al., One Century
of Arsenic Exposure in Latin America: A Review of History and Occurrence from 14
Countries, 429 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 2 (2012); WILLIAM HOLDEN & R. DANIEL
JACOBSON, MINING AND NATURAL HAZARD VULNERABILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES:
DIGGING TO DEVELOPMENT OR DIGGING TO DISASTER (2012).
For more on how to assess the environmental, social and economic costs and
benefits of mining regimes, see Robin Broad, Responsible Mining: Moving from a
Buzzword to Real Responsibility, 1 THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND SOC’Y 4, 5 (2014)
(explaining the need for valid definitions of responsible mining); Andrés McKinley,
Mitos y Realidades de La Minería de Oro en Centroamérica, CARITAS EL SALVADOR (Nov.
2013), available at http://www.movimientom4.org/wp-content/docs/mitos-yrealidades-de-la-mineria-de-oro-en-centroamerica.pdf
(assessing
the
environmental, social, and economic costs and benefits of mining regimes).
17 See generally note 15. For more on domestic and international opposition to
mining in El Salvador, as well as a list of other publications, see STOPESMINING,
http://www.stopesmining.org/j25/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
18 See supra note 15.
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the project. Social conflict escalated, culminating in the brutal
assassination of three anti-mining activists in 2009.19
3.2 At a national level:
As civil society became more organized against mining in
Cabañas, so too did it reach out to other groups across the country.
In 2005, a Salvador-wide coalition – La Mesa Nacional Frente a la
Mineria Metálica (National Roundtable on Mining)—was created
that, after some deliberation, decided a key part of its work would
be to push the national government to ban metallic mining. Such a
sentiment had widespread support in El Salvador. Indeed, by 2007,
an academic poll indicated that more than 60% of the Salvadoran
public was against gold mining.20 Notable vocal opponents
included the Catholic Church, but it was joined by
environmentalists, human rights advocates, academics, other
religious denominations, indigenous populations and so on, and
also larger-scale agribusiness dependent on water.21
So too, starting around 2005, were individuals in, and segments
of, the national-level government increasingly concerned about the
Id.
The details on these 2009 deaths and other subsequent assassinations were
repeated to the author on numerous occasions. For more details on the local level,
including the assassinations, see generally Like Water for Gold in El Salvador, supra
note 15; RICHARD STEINER, INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND
COMM’N ON ENVTL., ECON., AND SOC. POLICY, EL SALVADOR: GOLD, GUNS, AND CHOICE
13, 40-44 (2010), available at http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/
Steiner%20Salvador%20Mining%20Report.pdf.
For more on domestic and international opposition to mining in El Salvador,
as well as a list of other publications, see also STOPESMINING, supra note 17.
20
The poll asks: “Do you think El Salvador is an appropriate country for
metallic mining?” 62.4 percent say “no.” Consulta De Opinión Pública De Octubre
De 2007, INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA, UNIVERSIDAD
CENTROAMERICANA 54 (Nov. 2007), http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/
Web/2008/finalmineria040208.pdf.
21 For related questions on the roles of civil society, the private sector and the
government, as well as to the overall political economy of El Salvador, see generally
The Poor and the Environment: Friends or Foes?, supra note 15 at 420-23.
On hypotheses related to the role of various social sectors in El Salvador, see
Rachel Nadelman, Sitting on a Gold Mine: El Salvador’s Departure from
Extractive-led Growth (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of
International Service, American University) (on file with author).
Given
Nadelman’s 2014 fieldwork in El Salvador, her Ph.D. dissertation is likely to
contribute significantly to this literature.
19
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environmental and social impacts of mining and the government’s
own inability to regulate the mining firms. Interestingly enough,
research shows that this concern surfaced around 2005 and gelled in
2006 – when the conservative administration of President Antonio
Saca was in power. Then, an unusual and (in this author’s mind)
far-sighted alliance grew between the Ministry of Economy and the
Ministry of the Environment over the need to conduct a “strategic
environmental review,” not just an economic review, before any
metallic mining activities could proceed or any applications related
to metallic mining would be processed. A de facto moratorium was
thus born. However, the actual task of conducting such a strategic
environmental review was left to the progressive Farabundo Martí
National Liberation Front (“FMLN”) government elected in 2009.22
On assuming office on June 1, 2009, President Mauricio Funes
continued the de facto moratorium on metals mining. Funes,
focusing especially on the fragility of Lempa River watershed,
announced that there would be no mining exploitation licenses or
concessions granted during his administration. This stance has
carried over into a third administration – that of the FMLN’s
Salvador Sánchez Ceren, who assumed office in July 2014. As
Sánchez Ceren’s Minister of Economy stressed in an interview with
the author, “Our country should be called Lempa . . . because the
river is everything.”23
It is important to separate this national-level policy on gold
mining from the specific case of Pacific Rim. As noted above, Pacific
Rim had an exploration license but – and this is key – it never received
an actual exploitation concession, that is the right to mine. In order to
receive an exploitation concession, it needed to meet certain
conditions; the factual record shows that it never met three of these
conditions. (We will return to this in next subsection on the global
level.) Pacific Rim, however, argues that, in granting it an
exploration license, the government of El Salvador was essentially
giving it a green light on the exploitation license.

22 This is perhaps why much writing on this case incorrectly credits the Funes
administration with the initiative on this.
23
Interview with Tharsis Salomón López, Minister of Economy, in San
Salvador (July 18, 2014).
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3.3 At the global level and ICSID:
Rather than pursue the case in El Salvador’s domestic court
system, Pac Rim filed an international arbitration case against the
Republic of El Salvador on April 30, 2009.24 This then brings us to
Washington, D.C. and the World Bank Group’s ICSID.
An important detail here is that Pac Rim Cayman, not its
Canada-based parent company Pacific Rim, officially brought this
case before ICSID. In a nutshell, Pac Rim’s claim built on the logic
explained in the prior section: We received an exploration license,
so you have to give us exploitation concession – that is, an actual
mining concession. We were assured of the government’s support
for our project repeatedly by a top Salvadoran government official
and the government’s overall change of mining policy is thus unfair
and illegal and we should be compensated appropriately by
ordering El Salvador to pay us the market value of the gold that is
still under the ground.25 Again, this is the essence of Pac Rim’s
claim.
Then, following ICSID protocol, a case-specific ICSID tribunal
was set up, composed of three arbitrators (typically lawyers), each
one of them paid $3,000 for every day of work.26 What transpired
procedurally as the first step was the jurisdictional stage hearing.27
24 See generally Pac Rim, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 14. To note some key
dates: The Notice of Intent was filed in December 2008 and the Notice of Arbitration
in April 2009, before the Funes administration took office. June 15, 2009 (just two
weeks after the start of the Funes presidency) was when ICSID registered the
Request for Arbitration. Id. ¶ 3. Note that the ICSID site was changed sometime in
late
2014
or
early
2015;
this
was
formerly
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet>.
25 See infra Part 3.2 (explaining that Pac Rim received an exploration license,
but did not meet the conditions necessary for an exploitation concession).
26 According to the ICSID site, arbitrators are entitled to “a fee of US$3,000 per
day of meetings or other work performed in connection with the proceedings
(corresponding to US $375 per hour).” Claims for Fees and Expenses, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/arbitrators/Pages/Claims-forFees-and-Expenses.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
For more on selection and appointment of tribunal members, see Selection and
Appointment of Tribunal Members – ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Selection-andAppointment-of-Tribunal-Members-Convention-Arbitration.aspx (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015).
27
Case Details, International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?Cas
eNo=ARB/09/12&tab=DOC (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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In an example of what critics call “treaty shopping,”28 Pac Rim
submitted its case under two potential jurisdictions: under the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and also under
El Salvador’s domestic investment law.29 In the jurisdictional
decision, the tribunal rejected CAFTA’s jurisdiction (rightly so, since
Canada was not a signatory to CAFTA and the Canadian company’s
decision to change the nationality of its shell subsidiary from the
Cayman Islands to the United States did not mean the newlyestablished US company could enjoy the benefits of CAFTA).30
However, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction under the domestic
investment law.31 This already suggested pro-corporate bias: the
details of the submission should have led the tribunal to throw out
the case since Pac Rim claimed that it did not know about the
potential problems with getting the concession until March 2008, but
that claim was disproved by indisputable evidence including emails
from Pac Rim top officials dating as early as 2005.32 (More on this
below.)
With jurisdiction accepted, the case moved into its merits – or
substantive – stage. It is worth noting that, at ICSID, the merits stage
is overseen by the same three-person tribunal as the jurisdictional
28
See Inna Uchkunova, Drawing a Line: Corporate Restructuring and Treaty
Shopping in ICSID Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/03/06/drawing-a-line-corporaterestructuring-and-treaty-shopping-in-icsid-arbitration/ (defining treaty-shopping
“as the process of routing an investment so as to gain access to a BIT where one did
not previously exist or for gaining access to a more favorable BIT protection.”).
29
Pac Rim, Hearing of Objections to Jurisdiction, supra note 14, Hearing on
Jurisdiction, 6:18-7:12 (May 2, 2011).
30
Pac Rim, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 14, ¶ 7.1 (June 1, 2012). This
involved the change of nationality of Pac Rim Cayman LLC from the Cayman
Islands to the United States, without Pac Rim Cayman having any substantial
business activities in the United States.
(More details later in article, infra. pp. 114-15).
31 Id.
32
Infra p. 113; Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶¶ 68-69 (July 11, 2014), available at
http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=categ
ory&id=26:otros-documentos&Itemid=63. As the ICSID documents make clear,
Pac Rim knew this was a possibility shortly after submitting its application for a
concession, by early 2005. Id. The Rejoinder refers to evidence on the record that
Pac Rim was repeatedly notified of problems with its application from 2005-2007.
Id. ¶¶ 32-65. This was well “before then-President Saca confirmed in 2008 that
mining had to be studied before exploitation could be allowed.” Id. ¶ 65. In May
2007, the Ministry of Environment (MARN) and the Ministry of Economy told
mining corporations that there would be no more mining until a “strategic
environmental evaluation” was completed. Id. ¶ 64.
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stage. In other words, in allowing the case to proceed on
jurisdictional grounds, the three arbitrators continue their well-paid
jobs. The merits hearing was held in September 2014, with a ruling
likely sometime in 2015 (unknown as of this writing).33
The merits stage focused on technical issues and narrow
grounds: whether Pac Rim had met the conditions for a mining
concession. With meticulous detail (including use of internal Pac
Rim emails), the government’s lawyers focused on proving that Pac
Rim knew it had not successfully completed the key three
requirements for being granted an exploitation concession: (1) Pac
Rim did not get government approval for its Environmental Impact
Study (EIS) because the EIS that Pac Rim submitted was not deemed
satisfactory, in particular for its failure to cover the full area where
Pac Rim hoped to mine; (2) Pac Rim did not submit the required
feasibility study; and (3) Pac Rim was not even close to meeting the
requirement that it hold titles to (or permission to mine in) all the
land for which it requested a concession.34 The lack of land titles
also demonstrates that, contrary to Pac Rim’s claims, the majority of
the local population was not — and is not — supportive of Pac Rim’s
plans to mine in Cabañas. Pac Rim’s attempts to get the land titles
were not successful: Pac Rim had less than 13% of the required land
holdings, lacking more than 87% of land estimated to be owned by
over 1,000 people.35
On Pac Rim’s side, lawyers focused on Pac Rim Cayman LLC’s
President and CEO Thomas Shrake’s statements that he was “not
aware” of the reality of such legal complications.36 To the contrary,
however, documents make it clear that Pac Rim well knew that it
was not able to fulfill these requirements for an exploitation
33
Case Details, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/09/12&tab=DOC (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
34 Robin Broad, Summary of El Salvador’s Rejoinder on the Merits (11 July 2014)
in Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, THE BLUE PLANET PROJECT (Sept.
4, 2014), http://www.blueplanetproject.net/index.php/summary-of-el-salvadorsrejoinder-on-the-merits-11-july-2014-in-pac-rim-cayman-llc-v-the-republic-of-elsalvador/. See also Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶¶ 254-57.
See also Jen Moore et al., DEBUNKING EIGHT FALSEHOODS BY PACIFIC RIM
MINING/OCEANAGOLD IN EL SALVADOR: Oceana Gold in El Salvador (Mar. 2014),
available
at
http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/EightFalsehoods-Final-March-17-2014-WEB.pdf (explaining that Pacific Rim did not
meet the regulatory requirements to obtain a mining permit).
35 Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶ 98.
36 Id. ¶ 69.
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concession. Indeed, as early as 2005 Pac Rim was working with
President Saca’s vice-president and others to eliminate the
requirement that it hold all relevant land titles.37 Their plan to get
around this requirement was to attempt to convince the Salvadoran
Congress to amend or replace the mining law to remove this
requirement.38 The above points also refute Pac Rim’s argument
that a key reason it did not receive an exploitation concession rests
in the fact that it did not play along with the corruption of the Saca
administration (2004-2009).39 “This is nonsense,” to quote a sentence
used in the Rejoinder for another point.40
The fascinating details of this case are available publicly, thanks
mainly to documents posted by the Salvadoran government.41 The
merits stage was held in secret (with no outside observers allowed,
not even potentially affected individuals who signed amicus briefs).
Ironically, if this case had proceeded under CAFTA jurisdiction, the
proceedings would have had to have been made public. But, in the
jurisdiction allowed, both sides had to agree to open the hearings,
and both sides did not. The author knows from interviews that the
Salvadoran government was willing to have the merits stage open;
therefore, it seems reasonable to surmise that Pac Rim opposed such
transparency.
The case exposes additional “biases” inherent in ICSID’s
structures and procedures. Among them: Pac Rim Cayman LLC
has been able to finance its ICSID trial because its financiallyfloundering parent company, Pacific Rim, was purchased by
Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
Id. ¶¶ 71-72, 230.
39 High Stakes Poker (2012 Documentary encore), 1:55-2:16, 24:20-25:14 (Nov. 16,
2012), available at http://www.cbc.ca/player/Radio/The+Sunday+Edition/
Full+Episodes/ID/2324862711/.
40 Pac Rim, supra note 14, ¶ 68 (referring to Pac Rim’s denial that it lobbied the
government). Beyond not complying with the requirements needed to get a
concession and trying to change the law (both, as explained earlier in this article,
see supra Part 3.2; notes 37-8 and accompanying text), Pac Rim clearly had its own
plans to circumvent the democratic processes of El Salvador. Some of this appears
to have involved hiring key people as employees or consultants, from Manuel
Hinds to relatives of the vice-president, as well as providing funds to local
individuals and groups in Cabañas. See id. ¶¶ 69-70, 285-86, and 445. In this regard,
it is unfortunate that the ICSID tribunal did not require that Pacific Rim submit a
list of those persons to whom it paid more than a certain amount, as would be
required in a corruption or fraud case.
41
Descarga de Documentos, MINESTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, GOBIERNO DE EL
SALVADOR, http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&
view=category&id=26:otros-documentos&Itemid=63 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
37
38
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Canadian/Australian mining company OceanaGold in November
2013, just as Pacific Rim was running out of money. As a result,
Pacific Rim became a wholly owned subsidiary of OceanaGold,42
with enhanced financial ability to pursue the case at the tribunal.
But the claimant in this case remains Pac Rim Cayman.
This means that, should El Salvador win, its win is only against
Pac Rim Cayman – an entity that, as one knowledgeable insider
explained, has no actual address, no actual physical presence, no
bank account, and no actual money, “not a mailbox or a phone or a
desk.” OceanaGold will not have a legal duty to pay any ICSID
financial rulings against Pac Rim Cayman. This is an example of
what is called “third party funding” – a seemingly unfair situation
whereby, in this case, Pac Rim can get unlimited financial assistance
to pursue its case at ICSID, but, if El Salvador wins, it has access only
to Pac Rim Cayman’s finances.43
The financial costs of lengthy ICSID cases are also substantial.
According to insiders, each side has already spent over $12 million.
Even if El Salvador wins, the arbitrators may not require Pac Rim to
cover El Salvador’s legal costs. If El Salvador loses, Pac Rim has
asked for $301 million in compensation. Thus far, the government
has been insistent that it will pay rather than allow mining. But an
El Salvador loss at ICSID could open the flood-gates to ICSID suits
by other mining companies and, if the cost is high enough, actual
mining.
It could also have the effect of dissuading other
governments from putting environmentally-inspired restrictions on
mining.
In addition, the case is likely to drag on beyond the merits stage
into an annulment stage. Unlike courts and most judicial systems,
ICSID tribunals are not based on legal precedent, so there is no
42 Press Release, OceanaGold and Pacific Rim Mining, OceanaGold Agrees to
Acquire Pacific Rim Mining (Oct. 8, 2013) (published on OceanaGold website),
available
at
http://oceanagold.com/assets/documents/filings/2013-PressReleases/081013OceanaPacRimPressReleaseFINAL2.pdf.
The buyout seems
reflective of the relationship between “junior” exploratory ventures and more
“senior” mining companies. On this relationship between “junior” and “senior”
mining companies with a focus on Canadian firms, see Michael Dougherty, The
Global Gold Mining Industry: Materiality, Rent-Seeking, Junior Firms and Canadian
Corporate Citizenship, 17 COMPETITION AND CHANGE 339 (2013).
43
Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/17, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, para. 23,
n. 22 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.minec.gob.sv/index.php?
option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=30:commerce-group-vrsrepblica-de-el-salvador&Itemid=63.
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appeal on those judicial grounds. Either side can request an
annulment of the award based only on “procedural errors in the
decisional process.”44 Furthermore, the ad-hoc annulment tribunal
has the power to decide “not to annul notwithstanding that an error
has been identified. . .” 45
To conclude this section: Overall, the author’s detailed research
provides more than ample evidence and documentation that the
case of Pac Rim Cayman LLC v the Republic of El Salvador has no
merit. If the three ICSID tribunal members decide otherwise, it will
further prove the point of those who argue that ICSID is an
institution biased towards corporations and unable to weigh the
evidence using both the facts at hand and legal precedents. That this
case has been allowed to proceed is itself evidence of pro-corporate
bias.
Moreover, should El Salvador win, it will be based on legal
prowess and Pac Rim’s mistakes, not on the fate of the Lempa River
or the views of the majority of people in Cabañas. Indeed, the key
environment issues raised at local and national levels are not
material in ICSID procedures. Although El Salvador’s lawyers have
raised them,46 the impacts of gold mining on the Lempa River and
the centrality of the Lempa watershed to the future of El Salvador as
a country are not relevant to the proceedings.

44 ICSID Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of
ICSID, para. 72 (Aug. 10, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
2012/08/16755063/background-paper-annulment-administrative-council-icsid.
The logic behind the annulment process is explained by ARON BROCHES,
Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK,
ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 295
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995). Broches was World Bank Vice President and
general counsel and the key individual involved in ICSID’s creation, where he
served as Secretary-General from 1967-1980.
45 ICSID Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of
ICSID, para. 63 (Aug. 10, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
2012/08/16755063/background-paper-annulment-administrative-council-icsid.
46 Pac Rim, supra note 14. ¶¶ 57-65, 203-206, 249-255, 252-288; Id., El Salvador’s
Counter-Memorial on Merits, ¶¶ 249-55 (July 11, 2014).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

BROAD

9/24/2015 4:06 PM

868

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.
4.

[Vol. 36:4

FROM CASE STUDY TO ICSID

Let us now build from this case study of Pac Rim Cayman LLC
v Republic of El Salvador to expand on general points about this key
investor-state tribunal that is presented by its proponents as a levelplaying field. As the number of cases brought before ICSID has
ballooned,47 so too have the criticisms. As stated in this article’s
introduction, the arguments are that ICSID rulings are: (1)
increasingly biased in favor of investors over the state, and (2) too
narrow in their focus on commercial rights over broader noncommercial issues.48
The first, ICSID’s bias towards corporations, echoes the concerns
raised by the “Tokyo No” 21 countries fifty years ago.49 Indeed, a
first conclusion is that the Tokyo No countries were prescient in
their concerns. If anything, as ICSID’s workload has expanded and
as corporations’ global reach has expanded, ICSID appears to have
become increasingly biased towards private corporate investors.
This author is hardly the only one raising these criticisms. There
is increasing public airing of insider discomfort and discussion of
ICSID’s corporate bias. In 2014, prominent trade lawyer George
Kahale III publicly declared that ICSID tribunals, before which he
has argued cases, are increasingly biased in favor of the foreign
investors.50 Such insider critics have pointed out, since ICSID does
not build its cases on legal precedents nor allow for appeals based
on judicial reviews, there are no ways to correct such rulings.51 As
Kahale phrased it, “The system is broken.” Kahale has also
denounced the agreements that have empowered hundreds of

47 ICSID Secretariat, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2014-2), at 7 (2014),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/
Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202014-2%20%28English%29.pdf. A list of
completed and pending cases can be found at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx, accessed January 7, 2015.
(This was formerly: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp>).
48 See supra Part 1.
49 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
50
See generally George Kahale, Keynote Speech at Eight Annual Juris
Investment Treaty Arbitration Conference, Washington, D.C. at 4 (Mar. 28, 2014),
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=dff029f2-594e48b5-8318-f02adf7b632c (citing to transcript).
51 E.g., Nassib Ziadé, Is ICSID Heading in the Wrong Direction, BILATERALS.ORG
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?is-icsid-heading-in-the-wrong.
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corporations to pursue these ICSID cases as “weapons of legal
destruction.”52
Such criticism has been matched by member-country discomfort
and action. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela—all part of the original
Tokyo No—have left ICSID.53 South Africa is establishing a new
investment law that allows foreign corporations to bring such claims
only to domestic courts.54 India is conducting a review of its treaties
in the face of several corporate lawsuits,55 and Indonesia has
announced its intent not to renew its bilateral investment treaties.56
Australia declined to include these corporate rights in the 2005
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.57 Brazil has stayed out of
investor-state dispute mechanisms.58
A related set of biases moves beyond the concerns of the Tokyo
No fifty years ago. Here the argument is that ICSID’s purview is too
narrow. Why, for example, should the investor—as a non-state
Supra note 50.
Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does
Not Achieve, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/
itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-notachieve/; Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America: Criticisms, Withdrawals and
Regional Alternatives, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?
icsid-and-latin-america-criticisms.
54 Jackwell Feris, Challenging the Status Quo – South Africa’s Termination of its
Bilateral Trade Agreements, Publications, DLA PIPER (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.
dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/12/international-arbitrationnewsletter-q4-2014/challenging-the-status-quo/.
55 Supra note 1; Kavaljit Singh, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties – Are They
Worth It?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyondbrics/2015/01/21/guest-post-india-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-are-theyworth-it/?.
56 Ben Bland and Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral
Investment Treaties, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3WTC8rx2C;
Abdulkadir Jailani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia’s Experience: IIA Review
(Feb.
25-27,
2015),
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Indonesia_side-event-Wednesday_modelagreements.pdf; Matthew J. Skinner & Zara Shafruddin, Turning Tides, Publications,
JONES DAY (Oct. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/Turning-Tides-WhatIndonesias-Reconsideration-of-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Means-for-ForeignInvestors-10-10-2014/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=
syndication&
utm_campaign=View-Original.
57 Ann Capling and Kim Richard, Blowback: Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms
in International Trade Agreements, 19(2) GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS 151, 165 (2006).
58 Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Yes
or No, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/
itn/2008/11/30/investment-arbitration-in-brazil-yes-or-no/.
52
53
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actor—have the right to sue the government, while other
presumably key non-state actors such as the affected communities
are not even allowed to listen to ICSID’s often secret hearings, never
mind participate equally? Yes, there have been some small steps to
expand the potential voices heard by ICSID
arbitrators:
communities can submit amicus briefs59 — but only if they find a
lawyer60 willing to write one on their behalf and if the tribunal
accepts the submission. This is hardly true participation. And there
is not even any assurance that such briefs will be read or taken into
account by the ICSID arbitrators who preside over any given case.
At the time of ICSID’s founding, there were few universal
human rights instruments, save the ILO conventions and the 1948
UN Declaration of Human Rights.61 While there were a couple of

environmental treaties concluded prior to the advent of the ICSID
Convention, the international community focused its environmental
law-making efforts on the environmental field only after the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.62 In addition,
the key international instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples,
namely ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, date from 1989 and 2007, respectively.63 But

much has changed since the mid-1960s, including widespread
understanding of the centrality of environmental issues. The

59 On ICSID’s 2006 rule changes to allow amicus briefs, see Gary Born, et al.,
Investment Treaty Arbitration: ICSID Amends Investor-State Arbitration Rules,
Publications & News, WILMERHALE (Apr. 2006), http://www.wilmerhale.com/
pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90393 (discussing ICSID’s
2006 rule changes, including Arbitration Rule 37 allowing amicus briefs).
60 In the El Salvador case, for example, the Center for International
Environmental Law provided the legal expertise needed to write such a brief. See
Benjamin Miller, Jennifer Liu, Ramin Wright, and Jenny Yoo, The Guide for Potential
Amici in International Investment Arbitrations, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 15-16 (Jan. 2014), http://ciel.org/Publications/Guide_
PotentialAmici_Jan2014.pdf.
61 The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies,
United Nations Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/
Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
62 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 146
(4th ed. 2010).
63 Convention
No.
169,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last
visited May 9, 2015); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations
Permanent
Forum
on
Indigenous
Issues,
http://undesadspd.org/
indigenouspeoples/declarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples.aspx (last visited
May 1, 2015).
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Salvadoran government should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to
protect a key watershed from the adverse environmental impacts of
gold mining. Our instruments of global governance should be
structured to reward a government for so doing, rather than
punished by being sued at ICSID. It should be the duty of
governments – from local to national to global levels – to privilege
their responsibility to protect people and their ecosystems.
In its current structure, ISDS clauses and rulings by ICSID do the
exact opposite – providing a negative incentive on a national level
for environmental and social regulations, for fear of being sued for
“indirect taking” via regulation. This is what has been termed
“regulatory chill.”64
5.

THE URGENCY FOR CHANGE

To say that the outcome of the Pac Rim Cayman suit at ICSID
has profound ramifications for the future of El Salvador is an
understatement. So too does it provide lessons about better ways
forward vis-à-vis investor-state regimes.
There is urgency to this topic given far-reaching trade
agreements on the horizon—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)65—
that the Obama administration is negotiating with nations in the
Pacific and in Europe. If either or both are approved with investorstate dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions exemplified by the latest
TPP version (as of this writing), ICSID’s caseload will mushroom
further. And we can expect even more action in terms of investors’
propensity to sue governments not just for direct taking via
expropriation (the original purpose of ICSID), but also for indirect
64
See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State
Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, Nov. 2006, at 73, 85 (“The notion that regulators fear
raising environmental standards beyond the status quo because they believe it may
deter new investment or cause industrial flight has been termed regulatory chill.”).
65 See Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, A Strategic Fight against Corporate Rule,
THE NATION, Feb. 3, 2014, available at http://www.thenation.com/
article/177930/global-fight-against-corporate-rule (discussing the emerging
movement to “reverse the momentum” or national corporations which have
written and rewritten “hundreds of rules skewing tax, trade, investment, and other
policies in their favor” to the detriment of communities and governments). To
follow the controversy and protests, see Globalization & Trade, PUBLIC CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/trade/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
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taking via environmental, social, and other regulations that might
impinge on a foreign investor’s future ability to make profits by
irresponsible exploitation of a country’s resources.
Recently leaked documents suggest that several governments
are attempting to at least scale back investors’ rights (and, thus, the
power of ICSID) in these draft trade deals. This includes countries
in the European Union—notably France and Germany—voicing
concerns about the investor-state provisions they contain.66
It is also important to refute some misunderstandings about the
need for such investor rights’ protections and for ICSID. Proponents
would have one believe that the global economy would be seriously
damaged without such investor rights (as in the current ISDS
clauses) and their key venue ICSID, and that foreign investment
would dry up should a country not sign ISDS clauses and be an
ICSID member.67 To counter this hypothesis, one can simply point
66
On these member country actions, see Matthew J. Skinner and Zara
Shafruddin, Turning Tides: What Indonesia’s Reconsideration of Bilateral Investment
Treaties Means for Foreign Investors, Jones Day Publications, JONES DAY (Oct. 2014),
http://www.jonesday.com/Turning-Tides-What-Indonesias-Reconsideration-ofBilateral-Investment-Treaties-Means-for-Foreign-Investors-10-10-2014/?RSS=
true# (explaining that Indonesia is not renewing its bilateral treaty with the
Netherlands); Dario Sarmadi, Commission Mulls TTIP Minus Investor Arbitration,
EURACTIV (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/
commission-mulls-ttip-minus-investor-arbitration-309460
(stating
that
the
European Commission is debating whether to include investor arbitration in the
TTIP); The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014, at 78), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21623756/print (expounding that some
countries are withdrawing from treaties with ISDS clauses because of problems in
the arbitration process ); and Cécile Barbière & Anne-Claude Martin, French
government will not sign TTIP agreement in 2015, EURACTIV (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/french-government-will-notsign-ttip-agreement-2015-310037 (illustrating that some European Union countries
oppose ISDS clauses).
On states and citizens in the US “getting proactive” on TPP, see Karen
Hansen-Kuhn, States get proactive on trade agreements: The Maine model, INSTITUTE FOR
AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY (July 16, 2014), http://www.iatp.org/blog/
201407/states-get-proactive-on-trade-agreements-the-maine-model. See also the
campaigns and publications of the Council of Canadians, and its chairperson
Maude Barlow, California Drought, MEDIA LE CONSEIL DES CANADIENS,
http://www.canadians.org/media (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (exemplifying
Barlow’s objections to trade agreements), as well as that of Public Citizen’s Global
Trade Watch, and its director Lori Wallach, Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s
Global Trade Watch, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_
redirect.cfm?ID=17010 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (providing articles about trade
agreements involving the United States).
67
Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to
“Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Stratification” of Investment
Dispute Settlement, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 45, 50 (2014); Editorial Board, Don’t Buy the
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to Brazil, a leading host to foreign investment but, again, a country
that has never accepted investor-state dispute settlement in any
venue. To make a more general point: Foreign investors, if they
believe they are making a risky investment, can simply rely on
foreign risk insurance. And, like domestic investors, they have
recourse to the relevant domestic courts in a given country. Indeed,
here is another example of the bias created by ISDS’s reliance on
global venues such as ICSID: domestic firms have to go through
domestic courts; so should foreign firms.68
Those who follow the World Trade Organization and its dispute
resolution mechanism might note the irony: A fundamental rule of
today’s neoliberal push towards “ultra-globalization,” as embedded
in the WTO,69 is that a country’s rules must treat foreign and
domestic investors the same. The irony is, of course, that ICSID’s
existence seems to suggest that such ultra-globalization proponents
do not find it problematic to have foreign investors privileged over
domestic investors.
Fifty years ago, those 21 governments who were part of Tokyo
No were prescient in their concerns about ICSID and ISDS. This
article, with its central case study of Pac Rim Cayman LLC v
Republic of El Salvador demonstrates how an investor-state tribunal
that represents itself as an objective institution to resolve disputes
between the two sides has increased its biases toward the private
Trade Deal Alarmism, The Washington Post, March 11 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-buy-the-trade-dealalarmism/2015/03/11/41575fee-c1d5-11e4-9271-610273846239_story.html;
and
Time Worstall, Explaining TTIP and ISDS to George Monbiot One More Time,
Forbes, Jan. 14, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/01/14/
explaining-ttip-and-isds-to-george-monbiot-one-more-time/.
68 For more on the questionable relationship between investor-rights regimes
and FDI levels, see RETHINKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (Kevin Gallagher & Daniel Chudnovsky, eds.,
Anthem Press 2010); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397,
405-409 (2010) (discussing the relationship between BITs, increased FDI flow, and
property rights). Contra BITs ‘Not Decisive’ in Attracting Investment, Says South
Africa, Third World Network Info Services on WTO and Trade Issues, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK
(Oct.
8,
2012),
http://www.twn.my/
title2/wto.info/2012/twninfo121001.htm (explaining the South African
government’s position that there is “no clear relationship” between BITs and
increased inflows of FDI).
69 World Trade Organization, Settling Disputes, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 55,
(2015), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
understanding_e.pdf.
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corporation/investor side and commercial over non-commercial
interests.
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